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Abstract
We use detailed information on labor earnings and employment from Social Security records 
to document earnings inequality in Spain from 1988 to 2010. Male earnings inequality was 
strongly countercyclical: it increased around the 1993 recession, showed a substantial 
decrease during the 1997-2007 expansion and then a sharp increase during the recent 
recession. These developments were partly driven by the cyclicality of employment and 
earnings in the lower-middle part of the distribution. We emphasize the importance of 
the housing boom and subsequent housing bust, and show that demand shocks in the 
construction sector signifi cantly impacted aggregate labor market outcomes.
Keywords: Earnings inequality, social security data, unemployment, business cycle.
JEL classifi cation: D31, J21, J31.
Resumen
En este trabajo se utiliza información detallada de ingresos salariales y empleo procedente de 
registros de la Seguridad Social para documentar la evolución de la desigualdad salarial en 
España desde 1988 a 2010. La desigualdad salarial para los hombres ha sido fuertemente 
contracíclica: aumentó alrededor de la recesión de 1993, mostró un descenso sustancial 
en el período de expansión de 1997 a 2007 y evidenció un marcado incremento durante la 
crisis reciente. Esta evolución se ha debido, en parte, a la evolución cíclica del empleo y de 
los salarios en la parte baja-media de la distribución salarial. Enfatizamos la importancia del 
boom de la construcción y su posterior caída, y mostramos que los shocks de demanda en 
este sector han tenido efectos signifi cativos sobre variables agregadas del mercado laboral 
español. 
Palabras clave: desigualdad salarial, datos administrativos, desempleo, ciclo económico.
Códigos JEL: D31, J21, J31.
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1 Introduction
Earnings inequality is the subject of a large and growing literature. While most studies focus
on the United States,1 a recent series of papers has documented the evolution of inequality
in other developed countries.2 In this paper we consider the case of Spain, for which the
available evidence is rather incomplete.
The recent Spanish experience offers an opportunity to assess the consequences of large
cyclical variations on earnings inequality. During the last two decades, and compared to other
OECD countries, Spain has shown high levels and volatility of unemployment. The period
was characterized by two severe recessions– in 1993, and in the “great recession” that started
in 2008– and by a long period of expansion in between. Variations in unemployment over the
cycle were substantial: from 25% in 1994 the unemployment rate fell to 8% in 2007, before
increasing again to 21% in 2010. To date, few papers have analyzed the effects of sustained
expansion episodes or severe recessions on earnings inequality. As a focal example, the US
literature has mostly aimed at explaining trends in inequality over time, but has not paid
similar attention to its cyclical evolution.3 In this paper we assess the effect of the substantial
cyclical variations that Spain has experienced during the last two decades on the evolution of
earnings inequality, and we document several factors that have contributed to this evolution.
As a motivation for the analysis, Figure 1 shows the evolution of the logarithm of the
90/10 percentile ratio of daily earnings– a commonly used measure of inequality– between
1990 and 2010. These numbers are computed using a recently released social security dataset
which we describe below. We see that male earnings inequality closely follows the evolution
of the unemployment rate. During the 1997-2007 expansion, inequality decreased by 10 log
points, while between 2007 and 2010 it increased by the same amount. These are large
fluctuations by international standards: by comparison, male US inequality increased by 16
log points between 1989 and 2005 (Autor et al., 2008). The results for females are different,
showing a substantial increase in inequality in the first part of the period, although the last
part shows some evidence of a countercyclical evolution.
1Among the many references for the US see Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Levy
and Murnane (1992), Acemoglu (2002), or more recently Autor et al. (2008).
2See for example Gosling et al. (2000) for the the UK, Boudarbat et al. (2006) for Canada, Dustmann et al.
(2009) for Germany, or Manacorda (2004) for Italy. Piketty and Saez (2006) provide a historical perspective
for several OECD countries.
3The major explanations for the evolution of US inequality– the influence of skill-biased technical change
(Goldin and Katz, 1998), job polarization (Autor et al., 2003), or de-unionization (Lemieux, 2008b)– aim at
explaining increases in inequality at various points of the earnings distribution while abstracting from cyclical
effects. Notable exceptions are Storesletten et al. (2004), Heathcote et al. (2010), Guvenen et al. (2012), and
Barlevy and Tsiddon (2006).
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Figure 1: Earnings inequality and unemployment in Spain, 1990-2010
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This paper shows that a key factor to understand the countercyclical evolution of male
earnings inequality is the weight of the construction sector in the Spanish economy, and its
evolution during the last two decades. The 1997-2007 expansion was a period of housing
boom, where the house price index per square meter more than doubled in real terms. The
causes of this housing boom are still a matter of debate, candidate explanations being low
interest rates, the softening of lending standards in the mortgage market, the prevalence
of homeowner tax deductions, and the large migration inflows or the existence of overseas
property buyers, all of which may have boosted the demand for housing.4 We document
that the housing boom– and the bust that followed since 2008– had substantial effects on the
labor market, and in particular on earnings inequality. In the social security data, the share of
the construction sector in male employment increased from 14% to more than 20% between
1997 and 2006. During the same period, median earnings of construction workers moved
from the 30th percentile to the 40th percentile of the aggregate distribution. Since 2007 the
employment share has dropped to 13%, less than its 1990 level, while median earnings have
remained flat.
To rationalize the evolution of relative employment and earnings we outline a simple
multi-sector model where a demand shock (e.g., a surge in housing prices) affects one par-
ticular sector. In the model, an increase in demand for construction leads to an increase in
employment and earnings in that sector relative to the rest of the economy, while a drop in
demand (during the housing bust) has the opposite effect. We note that the demand shock
4See for example Garc´ıa-Montalvo (2007), Ayuso and Restoy (2007), or Gonza´lez and Ortega (2009). See
also Garriga (2010).
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explanation is also consistent with the observed fall in labor productivity in the construction
sector during the expansion period. Given that construction workers belong to the lower-
middle part of the earnings distribution, the increase in employment and earnings in that
sector has contributed to the decrease in overall inequality during the 1997-2007 expansion.
Following the methodology of Autor et al. (2005), we decompose changes in earnings inequal-
ity into changes in labor force composition and changes in returns– or “prices”. Including
measures of skills (occupation and education groups), experience, and sector indicators, we
find that both composition and price effects contributed to the decrease in inequality during
the expansion, while composition effects alone explain the steep inequality increase in the
period 2007-2010. Changes in composition reflect the fact that workers who joined employ-
ment during the expansion, as well as those who lost their jobs during the recent recession,
mainly belonged to the lower-middle part (but not the left tail) of the earnings distribution.
Our estimates of earnings inequality are based on recently released social security data.
In contrast with previous work based on cross-sectional and panel surveys,5 social security
records have large sample sizes, complete coverage of the part of the population that is affili-
ated to the social security administration (more than 80% of the Spanish working population),
and accurate earnings measurements. These represent a unique source of consistent data for
a period of more than twenty years: in Spain, there is no other dataset that reports infor-
mation on labor income over such a long period.6 In a recent study, Dustmann et al. (2009)
use social security data to provide an accurate description of the German earnings structure.
Here we use individual earnings records to provide the first description of Spanish inequality
over a long period of time.7
Although the social security dataset is well-suited for the study of earnings inequality, it
has two main drawbacks. First, the dataset has a proper longitudinal design from 2005 to
2010 only, whereas before 2004 the information is retrospective. This means that earnings
data come from the records of individuals who were in the social security system some time
between 2005 and 2010, either working, unemployed or retired. Comparison with the Spanish
Labor Force Survey and other data sources suggests that, despite this retrospective design,
past cross-sectional distributions of male earnings remain representative up to the late 1980s.
5Most of the previous evidence on the Spanish wage inequality is based on three datasets: the Spanish
wage structure survey, the European Community household panel, and the consumption survey. In Section 4
we provide a comparison with the results of Pijoan-Mas and Sa´nchez-Marcos (2010), Carrasco et al. (2011),
and Izquierdo and Lacuesta (2012). See also Hidalgo (2008) and Simo´n (2009). For evidence before 1990 see
for example Del R´ıo and Ruiz-Castillo (2001), Abadie (1997), or Bover et al. (2002).
6The longest running household survey is the Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA, in Spanish), which started
in 1976. However, EPA does not contain any information on earnings.
7Felgueroso et al. (2010) use the same administrative source as we do, with the aim of documenting the
driving forces behind the evolution of the earnings skill premium in Spain from 1988 to 2008. Ours is the first
paper to use these data for the purpose of documenting earnings inequality.
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In contrast, results for females could be subject to more severe biases. A second difficulty
is that, as is commonly the case with administrative records, our measure of daily labor
earnings is top- (and bottom-) coded. This represents a challenge for our analysis of earnings
inequality, as the 90/10 percentile ratio, for example, is censored. To correct for censoring,
we compare two approaches, and assess their accuracy using the tax files available in the
most recent years for the same individuals as in the social security dataset. Tax records are
not subject to censoring, making them suitable to perform a validation check. Our out-of
sample prediction exercise unambiguously supports one of the methods– based on cell-by-cell
tobit regressions. In the analysis we use the 90/10 percentile earnings ratio as well as the
80/20 ratio, which is not censored over the recent period.
To further explore the sources of the countercyclical evolution of earnings inequality we
consider three additional factors. First we use that, starting in 1998, our dataset records the
type of contract. Permanent and temporary/fixed-term workers enjoy very different levels of
labor protection in Spain, and effectively belong to a dual labor market (Dolado et al., 2002).
We show that the earnings gap between permanent and temporary workers experienced a pro-
nounced decrease in the period 1998-2006, before starting to increase in the recent recession.
Given the high share of temporary contracts in the construction sector, this pattern may
partly reflect the demand boom for construction workers. Second, although the minimum
wage is another candidate explanation, we argue that it is unlikely to explain the evolution
of inequality in Spain. Indeed, most of the 1998-2006 period of fall in inequality was char-
acterized by a slight decrease in the real minimum wage, while the minimum wage increased
during the recent recession as inequality was rising. Finally, while the large immigration
inflow of the early 2000s could be another potentially important factor, our evidence using
social security data suggests that immigration had little effect on the evolution of Spanish
earnings inequality.
Lastly, one limitation of most earnings inequality studies is that they focus on employed
workers only. This is a particular source of concern in Spain given the large variations
in unemployment rates and duration of unemployment spells, and the fact that earnings
inequality has tended to evolve in parallel with unemployment. In the last part of the paper
we compare two approaches for imputing income values to the unemployed, and document the
evolution of a combined measure of earnings and employment inequality. Accounting for the
role of unemployment in the evolution of inequality does not change the qualitative pattern
of Figure 1. However, taking unemployed individuals into account in the analysis increases
the level of inequality substantially, and has a strong quantitative impact on its evolution.
We view this exercise as suggesting that, in Spain, the combined effect of employment and
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earnings inequality should be taken into account in order to assess the welfare consequences
of inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start by providing some
background on the Spanish labor market, as well as a conceptual framework where we briefly
discuss the effects of a sectoral demand shock on earnings inequality in a simple multi-sector
model. We then describe the data and detail our censoring correction strategy in Section 3.
Section 4 shows the results on the evolution of earnings inequality, whereas Section 5 describes
the role of various factors in that evolution. Lastly, Section 6 jointly studies unemployment
and earnings inequality, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Spanish labor market: boom and bust
To motivate the analysis, we start by presenting several background facts on the evolution of
the Spanish economy in the past two decades. We then outline a simple model of the labor
market that is consistent with these facts, and has implications for the evolution of earnings
inequality.
Figure 2: GDP growth and unemployment rate, 1988-2010
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2.1 Background evidence
Figure 2 shows the evolution of GDP growth and the unemployment rate between 1988 and
2010. The graphs highlight two severe recession episodes, in 1993 and starting in 2008, with
unemployment rates reaching 20% of the active population. In between these two recession
episodes, Spain experienced a long period of expansion, with unemployment down to 8% in
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2007. The recent recession has been particularly severe, as the unemployment rate more than
doubled between 2007 and 2010.
Figure 3: Nominal house prices per square meter, 1995-2011
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An important aspect of the 1997-2007 expansion is that it was characterized by a sustained
housing boom. As reproduced in Figure 3, nominal house prices per square meter were
multiplied by three during that period. The consequences of the housing boom on the banking
system and the financial situation of households are part of the current debate in Spain. The
focus of this section is on the consequences of the housing boom and subsequent housing bust
on the labor market.8
As an initial piece of evidence, Figure 4 shows the evolution of employment and average
productivity (specifically, value added per hours worked) during the recent period, using
aggregate data. The solid lines show the evolution of total employment and productivity,
while the dashed lines show the same evolution within the construction sector. The left
graph shows that, while total employment increased during the expansion and fell during the
recent recession, employment in construction had a qualitatively similar but quantitatively
much more striking evolution. Indeed, the fall between 2007 and 2010 amounts to nearly half
of the population initially employed in the construction sector. It is also worth noting that the
construction sector is particularly large in Spain: for example, employment in construction
accounted for 11% of total (male and female) employment in 2000. As a result, it is natural
to expect that the fluctuations that affected the construction sector have had substantial
effects on the labor market as a whole.
8Interestingly, recent papers provide evidence that the housing boom also had implications for education
decisions (Aparicio, 2010, Lacuesta et al., 2012).
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Figure 4: Employment and productivity, aggregate and construction only
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Finally, the right graph on Figure 4 shows the evolution of average labor productivity
between 1988 and 2007, computed from EU Klems data. While average productivity in the
economy remained almost flat between 1995 and 2007,9 productivity in the construction sector
fell by 20% during the same period. A fall in productivity in a particular sector is consistent
with a positive demand shock affecting that sector. We next discuss the consequences of a
sectoral demand shock for employment and earnings inequality, in the context of a simple
model of the labor market.
2.2 Sectoral demand shock and earnings inequality
We now outline a simple multi-sector model that is consistent with the evolution documented
in Figures 2-4. This model has implications for the evolution of employment and earnings
inequality, which will be useful to guide the presentation and interpretation of our empirical
results in the next sections.
We suppose that the economy is composed of J different sectors, each of them populated
by a continuum of perfectly competitive firms. We abstract from capital, and assume that
output in sector j ∈ {1, ..., J} is given by Yj = L
α
j , where α ∈ (0, 1). Given the wage level
wj in sector j, and the price pj of the sector-specific good, the quantity of labor demanded
by a firm maximizes profit πj = pjL
α
j − wjLj , leading to a downward-sloping demand curve
wdj = pjαL
α−1
j .
9The slowdown of labor productivity growth between 1995 and the mid 2000s contrasts with the US and
other European countries; see for example Dolado et al. (2011).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1225
j is uj = lnwj + εj , and whose utility for not working is u0 = ε0. We abstract from skill
differences and assume that workers are equally productive. However, workers are assumed
heterogeneous in their tastes for working in each sector, as well as in their tastes for not
working. The distributions of individual tastes εj have means aj and common variance τ
2.
Introducing heterogeneity in valuations of sector-specific amenities is a simple way to generate
sectoral wage differences in equilibrium.10
As a result of utility maximization, the choice of working in a sector is given by a random
utility model (McFadden, 1981). It is mathematically convenient to assume that the individ-
ual tastes εj are i.i.d. draws from a type-I extreme value distribution, in which case we get
the closed-form quantities of labor supplied to sector j:
Lsj =
e
aj
τ w
1
τ
j
e
a0
τ +
∑J
k=1 e
ak
τ w
1
τ
k
, (1)
and the quantity of non-employment: Ls
0
= 1−
∑J
j=1 L
s
j , where we have normalized the total
size of the population to one. Hence, supply in one sector is increasing in the wage of that
sector, but decreasing in the other sectors’ wages.
In this simple framework, the consequences of a sector-specific shock on employment and
wages are easily derived. We have the following comparative statics result, which we formally
establish in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 As p (e.g., house prices) increases:
• w increases, wj for j =  increase, and relative wages w/wj also increase.
• L increases, whereas Lj for j =  decrease, and non-employment L0 decreases.
The intuition for these results is straightforward. As the demand curve shifts upwards in
sector , labor flows to that sector and wages increase. The increase in w makes other sectors
(and non-employment) comparatively less attractive, which leads to a decrease in Lj and L0,
and to wage increases wj for j =  in all the other sectors. However, and importantly for
inequality, these wage increases are lower than in the sector that was subject to the demand
shock, so relative wages w/wj increase.
The implications of the model for employment are broadly consistent with the left graph
of Figure 4, which shows an increase in the relative employment share of construction during
10In particular, individual heterogeneity in sector-specific tastes may partly explain why, despite the large
relative wage increases in the construction sector that we document, not all male low-skilled workers moved
to– or started to work in– that sector. Note also that sector amenities are only one way to explain wage
differences between sectors, the presence of mobility costs between sectors being another explanation.
There is a continuum of utility-maximizing workers, whose utility for working in sector
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the housing boom, and a fall starting with the housing bust in 2008. The demand shock
explanation is also qualitatively consistent with the right graph of Figure 4, as the model
predicts that average productivity Lα−1 should fall as a result of an increase in p.
The consequences of a demand shock in sector  on wage inequality depend on the relative
position of that sector in the wage distribution. Let us suppose that w belongs to the lower
middle part of the wage distribution, which broadly corresponds to the position of median
daily earnings of construction workers in the overall distribution in Spain. Then an increase
in house prices p is expected to have two effects on inequality. First, the share L of workers
working in construction will increase relative to the other sectors. All things equal, this will
tend to increase the size of the middle part of the distribution relative to its tails, leading to a
decrease in inequality. In addition, the wage w will increase relative to other sector-specific
wages wj . If w gets closer to the overall median this second effect will also tend to reduce
inequality.
Our empirical analysis of Spanish earnings inequality will show that these two effects–
changes in (sectoral) labor force composition and changes in returns or “prices”– have con-
tributed to the fall in inequality during the expansion period. In contrast, our evidence
suggests that composition effects alone explain the sharp inequality increase in the recent
recession, as a large number of workers employed in the lower middle part of the distribution
lost their jobs.
In the rest of the paper we document and interpret the recent evolution of employment
and earnings inequality in Spain. The empirical analysis takes into account several important
factors that we abstracted from in the simple model. In particular, we will account for various
dimensions of worker heterogeneity such as skills and experience. We will also account for the
effect of labor market institutions such as the distinction between permanent and temporary
labor contracts or the minimum wage. We now turn to the description of the social security
dataset.
3 The Social security dataset
Our main data source comes from the Continuous Sample of Working Histories (Muestra
Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL, in Spanish). The MCVL is a micro-level dataset built
upon Spanish administrative records. It is a representative sample of the population registered
with the social security administration in the reference year (so far, from 2004 to 2010). The
MCVL also has a longitudinal design. From 2005 to 2010, an individual who is present in a
wave and subsequently remains registered with the social security administration stays as a
sample member. In addition, the sample is refreshed with new sample members so it remains
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representative of the population in each wave. Finally, the MCVL tries to reconstruct the
labor market histories of the individuals in the sample back to 1967, earnings data being
available since 1980. As a complement to the MCVL, we will use tax files that have been
matched to the social security sample. These will be useful to address censoring issues.
3.1 Sample selection
The population of reference of the MCVL consists of individuals registered with the social
security administration at any time in the reference year, including pension earners, recipi-
ents of unemployment benefits, employed workers and self-employed workers, but excluding
individuals registered only as medical care recipients, or those with a different social assis-
tance system (part of the public sector, such as the armed forces or the judicial power). The
raw data represent a 4 per cent non-stratified random sample of this reference population,
and consist of nearly 1.1 million individuals each year.
We use data from a 10 per cent random sample of the 2005-2010 MCVL.11 We keep prime-
age individuals (aged 25-54) enrolled in the general regime.12 To ensure that we only consider
income from wage sources, we also exclude all individuals enrolled in the self-employment
regime. Then, we reconstruct the market labor histories of the individuals in the sample back
to 1980. Finally, we obtain a panel of 93,132 individuals (52,878 men and 40,254 women) and
more than 12 million monthly observations for the period 1988-2010. We present descriptive
statistics on sample composition and demographics by gender in Appendix D.13
The MCVL dataset represents a unique source of consistent data for a period of more
than twenty years. However, given its particular sampling design, using the retrospective
information for the study of population aggregates may be problematic in terms of represen-
tativeness. In Appendix B we consider three issues in turn. While attrition due to mortality
or migration out of the country is unlikely to affect the interpretation of our results, attrition
due to long periods of inactivity is a serious source of concern for women. For this reason,
caution will be needed when interpreting the results for women as one moves back in time.
11This selection was done in order to reduce the size of the dataset and ease the computational burden.
Taking another 10% random sample made almost no difference to the results.
12In Spain, more than 80 per cent of workers are enrolled in the general scheme of the social security
administration. Separate schemes exist for some civil servants, workers in fishing, mining and agricultural
activities, and the self employed. This means that these categories are not considered in this study.
13The reason for starting in 1988 instead of 1980 is that sample representativeness tends to become less
accurate as one goes back in time, as we document in Appendix B.
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Figure 5: Quantiles of uncapped daily Earnings
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Notes: Source Social Security data. Solid lines are observed daily earnings. Dark and light crosses are the real
value of the maximum and minimum caps, respectively.
3.2 Social security earnings
As it is often the case in administrative sources, the Spanish social security does not keep
track of uncapped earnings. The MCVL only provides information on censored earnings:
the “contribution base”, which captures monthly labor earnings plus 1/12 of year bonuses14
taking into account maximum and minimum caps. The caps vary over time and by occupation
groups. They are adjusted each year with the evolution of the minimum wage and the inflation
rate, as described in Figure C.1 in Appendix C, and in Table C.1 for the most recent years.
In most of the analysis, we use daily earnings as our main earnings measure, computed
as the ratio between the monthly contribution base and the number of days worked in that
particular month. Earnings are deflated using the 2006 general price index. The social
security data do not record hours of work, so we cannot compute an hourly wage measure.15
Figure 5 shows the 1988-2010 evolution of several percentiles of observed real daily earnings.
The crosses on the graphs represent the real value of the legal maximum and minimum caps.16
As a preliminary observation, we can see that real earnings have generally increased over
the period. For example, for males median daily earnings increased from 46.5 Euros in 1988
to 54 Euros in 2010. This represents an increase of 15.5% over the period. In comparison
14Important exceptions are extra hours, travel and other expenses, and death or dismissal compensations.
15The data contain measures of part-time and full-time work. Re-weighting daily earnings using these
measures makes little difference for males, although it does somewhat affect the results for females, especially
at the bottom of the earnings distribution.
16On the figure, the cap is calculated as an average of the legal caps across skill groups, weighted using the
relative shares of each group every year.
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for women the increase has been of 7.6%. As shown in the figure, however, the proportion of
top-coded observations is substantial. For example, for men the 80th percentile is observed
from 1998 to 2010, and the 90th is never observed. For women instead, the 90th percentile
is observed in 1998 and from 2000 to 2006. At the opposite end, we also see that the the
10th percentile of the female earnings distribution is capped during the whole period (except
in 1988). The presence of censoring complicates the analysis of earnings inequality. For
example, the 90/10 ratio, which is a commonly used index of inequality, is censored during
the whole period, for both men and women.
3.3 Censoring correction methods
We compare two earnings models in order to correct for censoring: the first one is based
on a linear quantile model (Koenker and Bassett, 1978, Chamberlain, 1991), while the sec-
ond method relies on cell-by-cell tobit regressions. The two methods are based on different
assumptions to recover the top and bottom-coded parts of the earnings distributions. We
describe these methods in detail in Appendix C.
The censoring methods deliver estimates of cell-specific earnings quantiles. In the case
of the tobit regression approach the qth conditional quantile of daily earnings in cell c, for
q ∈ (0, 1), is given by:
wqc = exp
(
μ̂c + σ̂cΦ
−1(q)
)
, (2)
where μ̂c and σ̂c are maximum likelihood estimates of the mean and variance of the cell-
specific normal distribution of log-daily earnings, and where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal
cdf. From these conditional quantiles, we recover unconditional quantiles by simulation, as
explained in Appendix C.
Cells c incorporate three sources of heterogeneity: occupation, age, and time dummies,
for a total of 82,800 cells. The use of occupation groups as a proxy for skills is motivated by
the fact that education data are rather imperfect in our sample: education is taken from the
municipal register form, and is only infrequently updated. Nevertheless, as a complement we
also present results using education dummies. For the same reason, we use age as a proxy
for experience, instead of a measure of potential experience net of the number of years of
schooling.17
To assess the performance of the two censoring correction methods, we take advantage of
the fact that from 2004 to 2010 the MCVL was matched to individual income tax data. This
allows us to assess the quality of the extrapolation, both in-sample (in the social security
17Another possibility would be to construct a measure of actual experience on the labor market. We do not
pursue this route here, as most of the literature on earnings inequality relies on age or potential experience.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1225
data), and out-of-sample (using the tax data). We start by showing how social security con-
tributions compare with taxable labor income. We focus on individuals with positive annual
taxable labor income during the period 2004-2010 whose social security contributions are
uncapped. Table 1 reports sample correlations between annual social security contributions
and annual labor income obtained from the tax data. The high correlations in levels indicate
that the two income concepts are related, although they are not identical. For example, social
security contributions exclude extra hours, travel and other expenses, and dismissal compen-
sations. These differences seem more relevant for high skilled workers, as the correlation in
levels between contributions and taxable labor income is lower for the first group (77%) than
for the others (over 90%). The second column in the table shows that year-to-year growth
rates are also strongly correlated between the two datasets, although correlations are slightly
lower than in levels.18
Table 1: MCVL matched with Tax data: Sample correlations
Group Levels Growth
Engineers, College 0.77 0.81
Technicians 0.90 0.80
Administrative Managers 0.90 0.81
Assistants 0.93 0.84
Administrative workers 0.93 0.86
Manual workers 0.94 0.85
Note: uncapped observations.
Next we evaluate the predictive power of the two censoring correction methods. The left
two columns of Figure 6 show the in-sample prediction, by comparing the observed social
security earnings quantiles with the ones predicted using quantile regression (first column)
and tobit regression (second column). As in Figure 5, the real values of the maximum and
minimum caps are represented by crosses in the graph. The results show that the tobit
method outperforms quantile regression in terms of fitting the social security data. The
difference is particularly noticeable in the upper-part of the earnings distribution. Moreover,
while the tobit method rightly predicts earnings above or below the caps when the data are
censored, the 90th percentile predicted by the quantile regression method is often below the
cap. This provides a first evidence of the superiority of the tobit regression method.
The last two columns of Figure 6 then show the out-of-sample prediction, for individuals
18As an additional piece of evidence, Figure C.2 in Appendix C shows the distributions of the social security
contributions (solid lines) and the taxable labor income (dashed lines). We can see that the uncensored parts
of the distributions are rather similar.
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Figure 6: Prediction performance of the two censoring correction methods
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Notes: Sources Social Security data and Income Tax data. Dark and light crosses represent the real value of
the maximum and minimum caps, respectively. On the left panel, solid lines are observed earnings quantiles
in the social security dataset, and dashed lines are the predicted quantiles. On the right panel, solid lines are
observed quantiles of labor income from the tax data, and dashed lines are the quantiles of earnings predicted
using the social security sample.
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present both in the social security and tax samples. The results compare the predicted
earnings quantiles (using either of the two methods) with the income quantiles of the tax data.
This out-of-sample comparison exercise clearly favors the tobit regression approach. While
using this method the overall 90th and 10th percentiles are reasonably well reproduced, the
fit of the quantile regression method is quite poor. For example, for males the 90th earnings
percentile is predicted to lie well below the value of the cap.19
In the rest of the paper we use cell-by-cell tobit regression estimates to assess the recent
evolution of earnings inequality in Spain. When interpreting the results, it will be important
to keep in mind that the censoring correction is not perfect. Although the comparison with the
tax data suggests that it does a relatively good job for the more recent period, the accuracy
of the extrapolation may be poorer in the first part of the sample, where the amount of
censoring is larger (see Figure C.1 in Appendix C). In order to alleviate concerns related
to the extrapolation, we shall document the evolution of the 20th and 80th percentiles as a
complement to the more commonly used 10th and 90th percentiles.
4 Overall evolution of earnings inequality
In this section we start by describing the evolution of earnings inequality in Spain from 1988
to 2010. Then we compare our results with recent papers that have attempted to document
the evolution of Spanish inequality using other data sources.
4.1 Patterns of inequality
Figure 7 shows the evolution of several inequality measures over the period: the ratio of the
90th to 10th earnings percentiles (90/10), the ratio of the 90th to 50th (90/50), and the ratio
of the 50th to 10th (50/10). Table 2 reports the numerical values of the 10, 50, and 90th
percentiles, and the corresponding ratios, for some particular years.
In Figure 7 we can see that earnings inequality has experienced a marked hump-shaped
pattern, followed by a sharp increase at the end of the period. The fluctuations in inequality
are inversely related to the business cycle. According to Table 2, for men the 90/10 earnings
ratio increased by 16% between 1988 and 1996, then decreased by 9.5% between 1997 and
2006, after which inequality increased again by 9.5%.20
19Using education instead of occupation categories as a proxy for skills yields comparable picture, although
the out-of sample fit using the tobit regression method is slightly worse for men (not reported).
20Note that the median and 90th earnings percentile levels increased more during the two recessions than
during the expansion. This may partly reflect the cyclical changes in employment composition that we
document in the next section.
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Figure 7: Inequality Ratios: 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10
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Notes: Source Social Security data. Solid lines are ratios of estimated unconditional quantiles of daily earnings.
In addition, Table 2 shows that the inequality increase in the earlier period was essen-
tially concentrated in the upper part of the earnings distributions, as the 90/50 earnings
ratio increased by 11.6% while the 50/10 earnings ratio increased by 3.9%. In contrast, the
decrease during the 1997-2006 period and the subsequent increase affected the two halves
of the distribution similarly. The results for women follow a qualitatively similar pattern,
although the fall in inequality seems to have started later for them (early 2000s) and to have
been less pronounced. There is also evidence of an inequality increase in the recent recession
for women, as the 90/10 earnings ratio increased by 5.2% between 2007 and 2010.
One concern with the 90/10 ratio is that it is sensitive to the chosen censoring method.21
Less subject to censoring are the 80/20, 80/50, and 50/20 earnings inequality ratios which
we show in Figure 8. The picture of inequality is very similar to Figure 7, with a marked
countercyclical pattern. Quantitatively, the changes are of a slightly smaller magnitude. For
21We also computed inequality measures using the 2004-2010 tax data, which are not subject to censoring.
We found that the 90/10 ratio increased by 11% between 2007 and 2010. Although the tax and social security
data differ in several respects, this provides additional evidence of a substantial inequality increase in the
recent recession.
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Table 2: Estimated Quantiles of Daily Earnings and Inequality Ratios
1988 1997 2007 2010 1988-1996 1997-2006 2007-2010
(%) (%) (%)
(A) Estimated Quantiles of Daily Earnings
All w10 25.5 24.2 25.5 25.0 -4.96 2.73 -1.71
w50 45.8 47.3 49.0 50.3 3.14 1.20 2.69
w90 92.3 104.9 106.2 113.4 14.00 -1.74 6.79
Men w10 26.8 27.2 30.1 29.8 1.24 7.32 -1.01
w50 47.6 50.3 53.0 55.3 5.23 2.59 4.47
w90 98.2 115.4 115.6 125.4 17.41 -2.90 8.45
Women w10 22.6 20.1 21.3 21.3 -10.74 3.39 0.19
w50 41.0 41.8 43.2 44.2 2.03 1.24 2.46
w90 76.8 88.9 95.3 100.5 16.42 4.04 5.36
(B) Ratios from Estimated Quantiles
All w90/w10 3.62 4.34 4.17 4.53 19.95 -4.35 8.65
w90/w50 2.01 2.22 2.17 2.25 10.52 -2.91 3.99
w50/w10 1.80 1.96 1.92 2.01 8.53 -1.49 4.48
Men w90/w10 3.67 4.23 3.84 4.21 15.97 -9.53 9.55
w90/w50 2.06 2.29 2.18 2.26 11.57 -5.35 3.81
w50/w10 1.78 1.85 1.76 1.86 3.94 -4.41 5.53
Women w90/w10 3.40 4.43 4.47 4.71 30.44 0.63 5.16
w90/w50 1.87 2.13 2.21 2.27 14.11 2.77 2.82
w50/w10 1.81 2.08 2.03 2.07 14.31 -2.09 2.27
Note: Unconditional quantiles estimated from Social Security data.
example, for men the 80/20 ratio increased by 11.3% between 1988 and 1996, decreased by
3.4% between 1997 and 2006, and increased by 6.0% between 2007 and 2010.22
These fluctuations of inequality are substantial by international standards. To see this,
consider the well documented case of the United States. According to Autor et al. (2008),
and as reproduced in Table 3, male inequality measured by the 90/10 percentile ratio increased
by 18% between 1973 and 1989.23 This corresponds to a yearly increase of 1%. A slightly
lower yearly rate of increase in inequality was found by Dustmann et al. (2009) for Germany.
In comparison, in Spain between 1997 and 2006 the 90/10 ratio decreased at a 1% rate per
year, while between 2007 and 2010 it increased at a 2.4% rate per year.
22As an additional robustness check, we computed the evolution of inequality as in Figure 7 using education
dummies instead of occupation groups to predict earnings, finding similar results. We also re-weighted the
data using mortality rates by gender and age groups, again finding very similar results.
23A slight difference between the results in Autor et al. (2008) and ours is that they compute changes in
log-percentile ratios, while we compute percentage changes in percentile ratios. Using changes in log-percentile
ratios instead gives very similar results to the ones reported in Table 3.
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Figure 8: Inequality Ratios: 80/20, 80/50, and 80/20
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Notes: Source Social Security data. Solid lines are ratios of estimated unconditional quantiles of daily earnings.
4.2 Comparison with previous studies
Here we briefly compare our results with recent papers on earnings distributions in Spain.
Pijoan-Mas and Sa´nchez-Marcos (2010) combine two different data sets: the longitudinal
consumption survey (ECPF), which was run between 1985 and 1996, and the Spanish section
of the European household panel, which covers 1994 to 2001. Their main outcome is the
hourly wage, in a sample of workers aged 25 to 60 who supply a positive number of hours.
Given that there are no available data on hours in the ECPF, they can only build series
of hourly wages for the period 1994 to 2001. According to their results, wage inequality
increased between 1994 and 1997 and decreased afterwards. Moreover, they find that the
fall in inequality after 1997 was driven by compression at both ends of the wage distribution.
Although our data differ both in terms of the earnings measure (daily instead of hourly wages)
and sample selection (prime-age employees in our case), we obtain comparable results on the
period they study.
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Table 3: Changes in Overall Inequality Ratios (%)
United States* Spain** Germany***
1973-1989 1989-2005 1988-1996 1997-2006 2007-2010 1980-1990 1990-2000
90/10 90/10 85/15
Men 18.3 16.4 15.97 -9.53 9.55 8.3 10.7
Women 25.7 12.7 30.44 0.63 5.16
90/50 90/50 85/50
Men 10.2 14.2 11.57 -5.35 3.81 5.8 5.1
Women 11.3 9.8 14.11 2.77 2.82
50/10 50/10 50/15
Men 8.1 2.1 3.94 -4.41 5.53 2.5 5.6
Women 14.4 2.8 14.31 -2.09 2.27
Notes: * Overall Hourly Inequality Measures from Autor et al. (2008). ** Ratios of quantiles estimated
from Spanish Social Security data. *** Overall Daily Inequality Measures from Dustmann et al. (2009)
Using data from the Wage Structure Survey, of which three waves (1995, 2002 and 2006)
are available, Carrasco et al. (2011) and Izquierdo and Lacuesta (2012) find that inequality
decreased slightly between 1995 and 2006. This survey consists of a random sample of workers
from firms of at least 10 employees in the manufacturing, construction and services sectors.
In 2002 the coverage of the survey was extended to some non-market services (educational,
health, and social services sectors) which were not included in the 1995 wave. Table D.1
in Appendix D compares inequality ratios from the social security records and the wage
structure survey in years 1995, 2002 and 2006. Although the levels of those ratios differs,
especially for women, the evolution is qualitatively similar. For men, Carrasco et al. (2011)
find a decrease of 1.3% in 1995-2002 (or 4.2%, depending on the sample), and of 7.1% in
2002-2006, whereas we find decreases of 0.1% in 1995-2002 and 9% in 2002-2006. For women,
Carrasco et al. (2011) find a decrease of 14.4% in 2002-2006 using the wage structure survey,
while using the social security records the decrease is only 5.3%.
Compared to previous work on earnings inequality in Spain, the evidence presented in this
section offers two main new insights. First, a long-period view shows that Spanish inequality
has experienced a marked countercyclical pattern, the (expansion) period of fall in inequality
being surrounded by two (recession) periods where inequality increased sharply. Second, the
magnitudes of these changes are large by international standards, challenging the common
view that the Spanish earnings distribution has been stable over time. In the next section
we study several factors that may have explained this idiosyncratic evolution.
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5 Explaining the evolution of inequality
In this section we document the impact of various factors on the evolution of male earnings
inequality. We particularly emphasize the role of labor force characteristics (skills, experience,
and sectors), while also accounting for labor market institutions (duality and the minimum
wage) and immigration as potential explanations for the evolution of inequality. The focus
on males is motivated by the fact that the evolution of inequality has been more stable for
women in the 1997-2010 period, as well as by the data limitations that we mentioned in
Section 3. A more precise assessment of the factors that have driven the evolution of female
earnings inequality is out of the scope of this paper.
5.1 Skills, experience and sectors: preliminary evidence
We start by providing some evidence on employment and earnings by skill and experience
groups. Figure 9 shows median daily earnings by occupation groups (our main proxy for
skills) and age groups (our proxy for experience) for Spanish males. We also show results
by education groups (college and non-college). The bottom graphs show the shares of these
groups in total male employment.24
The top left graph of Figure 9 shows that the ratio of median daily earnings between high-
skilled (occupation groups 1-3) and low-skilled workers (groups 4-10) increased during the
early 1990s and remained approximately stable from 1997 to 2010. The central graph shows
the ratio between the median daily earnings of college graduates and those of non-college
graduates (that is, the “college premium”). Interestingly, we see that the college premium
increased slightly in the early 1990s, and then decreased substantially until 2004, by roughly
10%. This evidence of a decline in the college premium in Spain has been documented before
(e.g, Pijoan-Mas and Sa´nchez-Marcos, 2010, Felgueroso et al., 2010). We shall see below that
it has partly contributed to the decline in inequality during the Spanish expansion. Part of
the evolution of the occupation and college earnings premia may be due to the fact that, as we
see on the bottom graphs, while the share of high-occupation groups has remained relatively
constant during the period the share of college graduates has increased substantially. Lastly,
note also a slight increase in the college premium since 2004.
The top right graph of Figure 9 shows the ratio of median daily earnings of older workers
(more than 35 years) and young workers. We see that, like the skill and education premia,
this “age premium” increased in the early 1990s. Moreover, we observe a sizable reduction
in this gap from 1997 to 2006, and a slight increase at the end of the period. Also, on the
24Figure D.1 in Appendix D shows the corresponding figures for females.
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Figure 9: Skill, education, and age groups: earnings gaps and employment (men)
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between i) occupation groups 1-3 and groups 4-10 (“skill premium”), ii) college and non-college workers (“col-
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bottom graph we notice a decrease in the relative employment share of young workers during
the recession of the late 2000s.25
We next document sector-specific employment and earnings. The left graph in Figure
10 shows the evolution of employment shares by sector. To facilitate interpretation we have
aggregated sectors into 6 broad categories: industry (other than construction), construction,
private services: low, medium, and high-skilled, and public services.26 This graph shows
two salient facts. The first one is the steady decline of industry in Spanish employment.
The second fact is the sharp increase in the share of construction during the expansion.
Between 1997 and 2007 the employment share of construction increased from 14% to 21%.
25The results for women reported in the appendix are qualitatively similar, one noticeable difference being
that the college premium remained stable over the period.
26See Table D.2 in Appendix D for a detailed definition of the sectors. Note that in our dataset public
employees refer to those belonging to the general regime of the social security administration. Hence, some
government employees, such as the armed forces or the judicial power, are not included.
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Figure 10: Employment shares and median earnings, by sector (men)
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Notes: Source Social Security data. The left graph shows employment shares, by sector. The right graph shows
median daily earnings, by sector, expressed as ranks in the aggregate distribution of daily earnings. Sectors
are: industry (solid, black); construction (dashed, black); private services low-skilled (dashed-dotted, black),
medium-skilled (solid, gray) and high-skilled (dashed, gray); and public services (dashed-dotted, gray). See
Table D.2 in Appendix D for a definition.
Interestingly, that share decreased to 13% in 2010, less than its 1990 level. This remarkable
evolution points to a special role of the construction sector in the Spanish economy. By
comparison, the private service sectors experienced a steady but more moderate increase
during the whole period.
The results shown on the right panel of Figure 10 indicate that earnings in the construction
sector increased substantially during the expansion. In 1996, the median earnings in the
construction sector were at the percentile 30 of the aggregate earnings distribution. In 2007,
they were at the percentile 40.27 Comparing these results with the sector shares suggests that
demand for construction workers was high during the boom, and dropped very sharply from
2007.28 Indeed, despite the large employment loss shown on the left panel, relative earnings of
construction workers fell slightly during 2007-2010. This evidence is in line with the simple
multi-sector model outlined in Section 2.29 Note also that the demand for construction
27Note also an increase in relative earnings preceding the 1993 recession, which was in part a construction
bust (albeit of a smaller magnitude than the 2008 one).
28We also computed median daily earnings by sector and occupation group, and found that construction
earnings increased relatively to other sectors for both high/middle-occupation groups (groups 1-7, which
account for between 12% and 18% of employment in construction) and low-occupation groups.
29Note that the model implies that relative wages in construction should have fallen as a result of the housing
bust. Downward wage rigidity could be one reason why there was only a moderate decrease in relative earnings
in that sector.
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workers during the expansion went in parallel with a fall in the college premium. This
evolution sharply constrasts with other countries such as the US, where high-skilled workers
have been in high demand for the last three decades.
Figure 11: Inequality (men), with and without the construction sector
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Notes: Source Social Security data. Solid lines are ratios of estimated unconditional quantiles of daily earn-
ings, dashed lines are ratios of estimated unconditional quantiles of daily earnings in a sample without the
construction sector.
As an informal indication on the influence of the construction sector on the evolution
of male inequality, we take out construction workers from our data and compute inequality
measures in an economy without construction. Figure 11 shows the results. We see that the
fall in inequality during the Spanish expansion, and the increase during the recession of the
late 2000s, are less pronounced when taking out the construction sector. The 90/10 ratio
decreases by 5.7% between 1997 and 2006, as opposed to 9.5% when including construction
(see Table 2), while it increases by 4.2% in the sample without construction between 2007
and 2010, as opposed to 9.5% in the original sample. Similarly, the 80/20 ratio decreases by
5.0% as opposed to 7.2%, and then increases by 3.2% instead of 6.7%. This simple exercise
suggests that part of the movements in the male earnings distribution over the past 15 years
has been driven by fluctuations in the construction sector.
5.2 A decomposition exercise
In order to quantitatively assess the influence of skills, experience and sectors on inequality
we next perform a decomposition exercise. The decomposition is a simple extension of the
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method of Machado and Mata (2005), and has been applied by Autor et al. (2005) to study
US inequality.30
Methodology. We decompose the change in inequality between two periods, say t and
t′ - being t′ > t, into three components: change in composition, change in between-group
prices, and change in within-group prices. We take the final period t′ as the reference period.
To fix ideas, we present the approach in the case where skills and experience are the only
characteristics of interest.
We first compute the counterfactual earnings distribution that would have prevailed at
time t if the skill/experience composition had remained constant from t to t′. This coun-
terfactual distribution is simply obtained by re-weighting the time-t conditional quantiles by
the proportions of skill and experience groups at time t′ (as in Machado and Mata, 2005).31
We then compute an implied counterfactual measure of inequality (e.g., the 90/10 percentile
ratio). The percentage difference between this counterfactual measure of inequality at time
t and the observed value at time t′ is net of composition change.
In the context of the cell-by-cell normal model, the between-group and within-group price
effects are then easily computed as follows. Note that, by equation (2), the qth conditional
earnings quantile in skill/experience cell c at time t is given by:
wqc,t = exp
(
μ̂c,t + σ̂c,tΦ
−1(q)
)
,
where we have indicated the time subscript for clarity. Adapting the method proposed
by Autor et al. (2005) to our model we compute the between-group and within-group price
effects by moving μ̂c,t and σ̂c,t one at a time. Specifically, we start by computing the following
counterfactual conditional quantiles at time t:
wq,BGc,t = exp
(
μ̂c,t′ + σ̂c,tΦ
−1(q)
)
,
and then re-weight these conditional quantiles using the skill/experience composition at time
t′. The percentage difference between the implied counterfactual measure of inequality at
time t and the observed value at time t′ is net of composition change and net of change in
between-group prices. As a result, it solely reflects the change in within-group prices.
Note that the decomposition can be performed using different characteristics to form
the cells. We will use skill/experience cells, as well as skill/experience/sector cells based
30As noticed by Autor et al. (2005), this exercise is closely related to Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), and
is conceptually similar to DiNardo et al. (1996) and Lemieux (2008a).
31Note that this type of decomposition relies on a partial equilibrium assumption according to which quan-
tities of skill/experience do not affect prices.
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on our broad 6-sector classification. Note also that the results depend on the order of the
decomposition: composition effect, between-group price effect, and within-group price effect,
in this order. We checked that the results remain qualitatively similar when changing the
order of the decomposition.
Composition changes: an illustration. Before presenting the results of the decompo-
sition, we provide an illustration of the nature of composition changes in our data. Specif-
ically, we show that changes in employment composition over the business cycle have been
non-monotone in earnings.
Figure 12: Employment as a function of daily earnings percentiles (men)
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Notes: Source Social Security data. Percentage of days worked against percentile of daily earnings, 1993-96
and 2001-07 (left), and 2001-07 and 2008-10 (right). The bottom panel shows the difference in % days worked
between recessions and expansion.
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In Figure 12, we plot the percentage of days worked by earnings percentiles.32 Note that
daily earnings are observed only when the individual is working, so daily earnings are close to
measuring workers’ wages, or “skills”. We select three subperiods: the two subperiods when
unemployment was highest (1993-1996 and 2007-2010, respectively), and the subperiod when
unemployment was lowest (2001-2007).33
The top panel in Figure 12 shows that employment increases with daily earnings through-
out the distribution, and that employment probabilities are uniformly higher in expansion
than in recessions. Moreover, and interestingly, the difference in employment probabilities
between recessions and expansion is not monotone in earnings. As shown by the bottom right
graph in Figure 12, during the recent recession employment fell substantially less at the two
ends of the daily earnings distribution than in the middle, the maximum difference between
expansion and recession being observed around percentiles 30 and 40. The same pattern is
observed when comparing the 1993 recession with the expansion that followed (bottom left
graph), as employment increased substantially more in the middle of the distribution.
This evidence suggests that the decrease in inequality during the expansion, and the
increase during the subsequent recession, were partly driven by employment fluctuations
in the lower-middle part of the earnings distribution. This pattern is consistent with the
predictions of the multi-sector model of Section 2.
Results of the decomposition. We now provide a quantitative analysis of the effects of
composition and price changes on inequality. Figure 13 shows the results of a first decom-
position exercise, using skill/experience cells and taking occupation groups as a proxy for
skills. Let us consider first the top left graph, which shows the 90/10 earnings percentile
ratio. The dark bar shows that inequality increased by 16% between 1988 and 1996. The
gray bar shows that inequality would have increased by 12%, if the labor force composition
in terms of occupation and age groups had been constant to its 1996 level. The light bar
shows that there would have been no increase at all if in addition the cell-specific means
had remained constant over the period. This means that, out of the 16% total increase in
inequality between 1988 and 1996, 4% were due to composition effects, 11% to between-group
price effects, and virtually zero to within-group price effects. Table D.3 in Appendix D shows
the numbers.
32More precisely, we compute the percentage of days worked by workers whose median earnings lie between
two consecutive percentiles. For example, to compute the number associated with percentile 40, we consider
workers whose earnings percentile lies between percentile 31 and percentile 40.
33Using instead the four-year period of lowest unemployment (that is, 2004-2007) makes little difference to
the results.
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Figure 13: Age and occupation groups: decomposition (men)
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Notes: Source Social Security data.
Between 1997 and 2006, composition effects explain roughly 25% of the fall in the 90/10
percentile ratio. Between and within-group price effects, in particular due to the fall in
the age premium documented in Figure 9, thus explain most of the fall in inequality. In
contrast, price effects appear to be small during the 2007-2010 period where most of the
inequality increase is explained by changes in labor force composition, in particular by the
increased non-employment rates for the young and the low-skilled documented in Figure 9.34
Interestingly, for this last period the 90/50 and 50/10 results show that, while price effects
are small and even negative for upper tail inequality (90/50), they explain a substantial share
of the increase in lower-tail inequality (50/10).35
The results using education instead of occupation as a proxy for skills are qualitatively
similar, as shown in Figure D.3 in Appendix D. One interesting difference is that, while the
fall in inequality between 1997 and 2006 is partly explained by composition effects when
34In addition, re-weighting age and skill separately shows that skill composition– rather than age
composition– is mostly driving the composition effects (unreported).
35 Figure D.2 in Appendix D shows the results for women. Inequality from 1997 to 2010 has been more
stable than for males. One interesting finding is that the fall in lower-tail inequality (50/10 ratio) between
1997 and 2006 appears due to price effects only, while composition effects seem to have played in the other
direction.
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Figure 14: Age, occupation groups, and sectors: decomposition (men)
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considering occupation as a measure of skills, composition effects seem to play little role
when using education instead. In this case, the fall is in an important part attributable to a
decline in the education premium (see Figure 9).
Lastly, we perform a third decomposition exercise that takes into account skills (occupa-
tion), experience (age), and sectors simultaneously. The results are shown in Figure 14, and
in Table D.4 in Appendix D. Comparing with Figure 13 we see two main differences. First,
price effects– and in particular between-group price effects– now explain the fall in 90/50
inequality between 1997 and 2006. Second, while price effects partly explained the increase
in the 50/10 ratio between 2007 and 2010 when accounting for occupation and age dum-
mies alone, the increase is now mostly explained by composition effects when also accounting
for sectoral composition. Similarly, composition effects now explain approximately half of
the fall in 50/10 inequality between 1997 and 2006. This provides additional evidence that
changes in sectoral composition and prices, and in particular employment fluctuations in the
construction sector, explain a large part of the recent evolution of inequality in Spain.
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5.3 Other factors
In the last part of the section we study three other factors that may have contributed to the
evolution of male inequality in Spain: the duality of the labor market, the evolution of the
minimum wage, and immigration.
Labor market duality. In Spain, around one third of employees work in temporary jobs.
After the introduction of these contracts in 1984, they grew rapidly up to approximately 33%
of the labor force by the early 1990s. The proportion has remained relatively stable since
then until the current crisis, and represents the largest share in Europe. Most of the literature
has focused on the determinants of the duration and conversion rates of temporary contracts
into permanent positions,36 or on the effect of dual employment protection on productivity
(Dolado et al., 2011). Remarkably less is known about the effect of temporary contracts on
earnings over time.
Figure 15: Type of contract: temporary rates and median earnings (men)
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Notes: Source Social Security data. The left graph shows the share of temporary/fixed-term contracts in
employment. The right graph shows median earnings by type of contract.
In our administrative data, reliable information regarding the type of contract - permanent
versus temporary/fixed term - is available only since 1998, thus we restrict this analysis to
the subperiod 1998-2010. The left panel of Figure 15 reports the evolution of the temporary
rate in our data. As showed in Figure D.4 in Appendix D, temporary contracts are highly
concentrated among the young, immigrants, and low-skilled workers. By sector, temporary
36See for example Amuedo-Dorantes (2000), Gu¨ell and Petrongolo (2007), and Garc´ıa-Pe´rez and Mun˜oz-
Bullo´n (2010).
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contracts are disproportionately high in construction (63% on average over the period, and
67% from 1998 to 2006).
The right panel of Figure 15 shows the evolution of median earnings of permanent and
temporary workers. We see that the relative difference between the two types of contract
decreased substantially between 1998 and 2007, with the relative ratio between permanent
and temporary median earnings falling by almost 20%. This ratio increased from 2007 to
2010, by about 7%. The evolution of between-type-of-contract inequality is consistent with
the evolution of overall earnings inequality between 1998 and 2010. In addition, given the
high share of temporary contracts in the construction sector documented in Figure D.4, this
evolution may partly reflect the surge and subsequent fall in demand for construction workers.
Minimum wage. Another candidate to explain the evolution of inequality is the minimum
wage. In the US, several studies have argued that the decline in the Federal minimum wage
partly explains the increase in earnings inequality in the 1980s (see e.g. DiNardo et al., 1996,
Lee, 1999).
Figure 16: Real value of the minimum wage in Spain
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The minimum wage is unlikely to have played a major role in the evolution of Spanish
earnings inequality, however. Figure 16 shows the evolution of the real value of the minimum
wage between 1988 and 2010. We see that most of the 1998-2006 period was characterized
by a slight decrease in the real minimum wage, while the end of the 2000s saw a marked
increase between 2004 and 2009. This timing is unable to explain the patterns of overall and
lower-tail inequality that we have described.
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Immigration. During the last decade the inflows of immigrants in Spain increased sharply.
Available data sources (population census, administrative registers of residence and work
permits, labor force survey, ...) do not always coincide in the measurement of the stock of
foreign population in Spain, due to illegal immigration. Similarly, our dataset only contains
immigrants registered with the social security administration. As shown on the left panel of
Figure 17, the proportion among male employees of foreign-born workers increased from 5%
in 2000 to 16.4% in 2007, and then decreased to 14.4% in 2010. So, according to our data the
period of fall in inequality was associated with increased immigration, while the recent period
of inequality increase is associated with decreasing immigration. This pattern could in part
reflect the demand shocks related to the housing boom and bust of the 2000s. In addition, the
right panel of Figure 17 shows that, during the same period the native-immigrant earnings
gap experienced only minor changes until 2007, while it seems to have increased in the recent
recession.
Figure 17: Immigration: immigration rates and median earnings (men)
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Notes: Source Social Security data. The “immigration rate” is computed as the share of foreign-born workers
among employees.
As a crude way of assessing the effect of immigration of inequality, Figure D.5 in Appendix
D shows the evolution of the inequality ratios in a sample without immigrants. We see
that inequality figures are very similar to the ones in the full sample. This suggests that
immigration has had little effect on overall earnings inequality. One limitation of the exercise
is that immigration could have had an effect on earnings of non-immigrants, for example
by reducing the wages of native workers working in similar occupations. The evidence we
have presented does not seem to support this hypothesis, however, as for example earnings in
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the construction sector (where the share of male immigrants is highest) increased in relative
terms until 2007.37
The evidence presented in this section suggests the following interpretation for the evolu-
tion of inequality between 1997 and 2010. As a response to the high demand for construction
workers driven by the housing boom, the share of the construction sector in the economy
increased, and relative earnings of construction workers increased as well. More generally,
employment gains during the expansion particularly affected the lower-middle part of the
earnings distribution. New jobs were partly in the form of fixed-term contracts, causing a
decrease in the earnings gap between permanent and temporary workers. Immigration and
the minimum wage had at most small effects on the evolution of inequality, which fell sub-
stantially until 2007 while unemployment reached historically low levels. The 2008 recession
and housing bust played in the opposite direction, however, generating an increase in unem-
ployment and earnings inequality. In the last section of the paper we try to integrate these
two dimensions of labor market inequality together.
6 Earnings and employment inequality
Employment is another dimension of labor market inequality. In this final section our aim is to
take the level and duration of unemployment into account in order to compute unemployment-
adjusted inequality measures and document their evolution.
6.1 Earnings distributions adjusted for unemployment
We compare and contrast two different approaches to impute earnings values to the unem-
ployed.
Approach 1: Potential earnings. The first approach is based on a neoclassical Min-
cer model where potential earnings are equal to the marginal productivity of labor. As in
Heckman (1979), individuals decide whether or not to work by comparing their potential
earnings with their reservation wage. Several methods have been proposed to account for
non-random selection into employment in this framework.38
We follow Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) and make use of the panel dimension of our
data. For each non-employed worker, we recover her daily earnings observation from the
37See Figure D.6 in Appendix D for shares of foreign-born workers in employment, by sector. A recent
paper of Carrasco et al. (2008) does not find significant effects of immigration on either the employment rates
or the wages of native workers during the second half of the 1990s.
38See Neal (2004) and Blundell et al. (2007) for recent examples.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 41 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1225
nearest wave where she is working. Hence, when unemployment spells are followed by another
employment relationship, the imputed earnings follow a step function with a jump in the
middle of the spell.39 The underlying assumption is that the latent earnings of an individual
can be proxied by her earnings in the nearest wave where she is employed. Note that this
method is based on longitudinal earnings information, and thus effectively allows for selection
on unobservables.
Approach 2: Unemployment benefits. One limitation of the previous approach is that
it is not directly related to the benefits individuals actually perceive when unemployed. As a
complement our second approach uses unemployment benefits to impute labor income to the
unemployed. This approach depends on the benefits rules. We use a simple approximation
that mimics the rules of the Spanish system over the period, as reported in Table 4.40 For
this second approach we also use the panel structure of the data to compute the duration of
the unemployment spell. Our measure of previous earnings is the last (predicted) earnings
that the individual received when she was working. One specific feature of this approach is
that benefits decrease with the duration of unemployment.
Table 4: Unemployment benefits
Months of unemployment 1-6 6-24 25-48 49-72 73-96 97-120 >120
% of prev. earnings 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
6.2 Evidence on labor market inequality
We start by commenting the evolution of inequality in potential earnings, as shown in Figure
18.41 We see that the level of inequality in potential earnings is higher than that of earnings
inequality conditional on employment. This reflects the fact that there is positive selection
in employment. However, the overall qualitative pattern of evolution is preserved. For males,
the percentage changes in the 90/10 inequality ratio are comparable to those reported in
Table 2. For women, our results suggest that inequality in potential earnings increased more
strongly during the recession of the early 1990s.
We next turn to the second method to impute income values to the unemployed, based
on the benefits rule. By construction, this approach takes into account the duration of
39Notice that some of the imputed earnings are censored. We then apply the cell-by-cell tobit regression
method to predict earnings.
40As a simplification, we assume that the rule is stationary over the whole period.
41Figure D.7 in Appendix D shows the quantile levels, and Table D.5 gives the numbers.
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Figure 18: Inequality Ratios for Earnings and Potential Earnings
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Notes: Source Social Security data. Solid lines are ratios of estimated daily earnings conditional on employ-
ment. Dashed lines are ratios of estimated potential earnings.
Figure 19: Inequality Ratios for Earnings and Labor Income
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Notes: Source Social Security data. Solid lines are ratios of estimated daily earnings conditional on employ-
ment. Dashed lines are ratios of estimated labor income, based on imputed unemployment benefits.
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unemployment. Figure D.8 in Appendix D shows that Spain presents high cyclical variations
in employment and high incidence of long-term unemployment. Figure 19 shows that the
level of inequality is substantially higher than when using the potential earnings method.42
In terms of evolution, the 2008-2010 recession seems to have had a smaller effect relative to
the recession of the early 1990s. This could be due to the fact that these numbers partly
reflect the duration of unemployment spells, so the effect of a recession on overall inequality
may take some time to appear.
Overall, Figures 18 and 19 show that the level and evolution of inequality are magnified
when considering our combined measures of earnings and employment inequality, showing
large fluctuations along the business cycle. This suggests that, in the Spanish case, it is
worth exploring combined inequality measures– which take the impact of unemployment into
account– in order to assess the welfare consequences of inequality.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we use administrative data from the social security to characterize the evolution
of earnings inequality in Spain from 1988 to 2010. We document that the dispersion of
the earnings distribution has experienced substantial changes over the past two decades.
The pattern of male inequality shows a fall during the expansion, and sharp increases in
recessions. The magnitudes of these changes over the cycle of earnings inequality are large
by international standards.
The construction sector appears to have played a special role in this evolution. The
Spanish boom of the late 1990s and 2000s was also a housing boom. We find evidence that
sectoral composition and prices partly explain the fall in earnings inequality during that
period, and the sharp increase during the recent recession and housing bust. Consistently
with the implications of a demand shock in one particular sector, relative employment and
earnings of construction workers have risen and subsequently fallen. In the aggregate, the
fluctuations in earnings inequality went in parallel with the cyclical evolution of employment
and earnings in the lower-middle part of the distribution.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the social security sample that we use in this study
has limitations as well as advantages. Due to the retrospective design, results for women
should be interpreted with caution. In addition, the severe censoring in the earlier period
makes the results for the early 1990s possibly less accurate.43 At the same time, these data
42Table D.6 in Appendix D gives the numbers.
43Moreover, and importantly, our data are silent on the evolution of the right tail of the earnings distribution.
Alvaredo and Saez (2009) use tax data to document the evolution of top income shares in Spain over the last
century.
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offer a unique opportunity to follow workers over long periods of time. One interesting possi-
bility would be to estimate a micro panel data model in order to measure the vulnerability of
different individuals to the business cycle. Our data would allow to account for unobserved
worker heterogeneity, aggregate time effects, and individual dynamics, thus broadening the
analysis of inequality to incorporate earnings mobility as well.
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APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 1
We denote lnwj = zj . We will rely on two properties of the discrete choice model of sectoral choice
(e.g., Anderson et al., 1992, chapter 2):
1. Let S =
[(
∂Lsj
∂zk
)
j,k
]
be a J × J matrix. Then S is symmetric positive definite.
2. For all j, k, Lsj/L
s
k only depends on the difference zj − zk.
The second property is specific to the multinomial logit model with type-I extreme value errors.
The particular functional form (1) is convenient to simplify the proof, but could be relaxed. We
will also denote D = diag
(
∂Ld
1
∂z1
, ...,
∂LdJ
∂zJ
)
. Note that all diagonal elements of D are negative. As
for the sectoral choice model, the parametric assumptions on firms’ labor demand are not essential,
although they help simplifying the derivations. Essentially, these assumptions allow us to get back to
the 2-sector case.
Let Ldj (pj , zj) denote labor demand in sector j. We start with the equilibrium relationship:
Lsj (z1, ..., zJ ) = L
d
j (pj , zj) . (A.1)
It is easy to show that the solution of (A.1) is unique. We are interested in assessing the effect on
equilibrium (log-)wages and employment of a marginal increase in p. Without loss of generality we
assume that  = 1 is the first sector. We will show in turn that:
• wj increases for all j ≥ 2.
• w1 and w1/wj increase.
• L0 decreases.
• Lj decreases for all j ≥ 2.
• L1 increases.
For this, we start by noting that, by (A.1):
Lsj (z1, ..., zJ )
Lsk (z1, ..., zJ )
=
Ldj (pj , zj)
Ldk (pk, zk)
, for all j, k ≥ 2. (A.2)
It follows from the second property of the discrete choice model of sectoral choice and from the
parametric form of labor demand that the left- and right-hand sides of (A.2) only depend on zj − zk.
As this equality does not feature p1, we thus have:
dzj
dp1
=
dzk
dp1
, for all j, k ≥ 2. (A.3)
Let us denote dz/dp1 = (dz1/dp1, ..., dzJ/dp1)
′
. First-differencing (A.1) with respect to p1 yields,
in matrix form:
S
dz
dp1
= D
dz
dp1
+
∂Ld
1
∂p1
e1, (A.4)
where e1 = (1, 0, ..., 0)
′.
It is convenient to define the following 2× J matrix:
E =
(
1 0 ... 0
0 1 ... 1
)
.
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Note that, by (A.3) we have:
dz
dp1
= E′
(
dz1
dp1
dz2
dp1
)
.
Hence, using (A.4):
E (S −D)E′
(
dz1
dp1
dz2
dp1
)
=
(
∂Ld
1
∂p1
0
)
. (A.5)
Now:
E (S −D)E′ =
⎛⎜⎝
(
∂Ls
1
∂z1
−
∂Ld
1
∂z1
) (∑J
j=2
∂Lsj
∂z1
)
(∑J
j=2
∂Ls
1
∂zj
) (∑J
j=2
∑J
k=2
∂Lsj
∂zk
−
∑J
j=2
∂Ldj
∂zj
) ⎞⎟⎠ .
Hence: (
dz1
dp1
dz2
dp1
)
=
1
Δ
∂Ld
1
∂p1
⎛⎝ ∑Jj=2∑Jk=2 ∂Lsj∂zk −∑Jj=2 ∂Ldj∂zj
−
∑J
j=2
∂Ls
1
∂zj
⎞⎠ ,
where Δ = det (E (S −D)E′) and det(·) is the determinant.
It follows from the first property of the discrete choice model of sectoral choice that (S−D), hence
also E (S −D)E′, are symmetric positive definite. Hence Δ > 0. As
∂Ls
1
∂zj
≤ 0 for all j ≥ 2, and as
∂Ld
1
∂p1
≥ 0, we have that dz2
dp1
≥ 0. By (A.3) we have
dzj
dp1
≥ 0 for all j ≥ 2.
Now:
dz1
dp1
−
dz2
dp1
=
1
Δ
∂Ld
1
∂p1
⎛⎝ J∑
j=2
J∑
k=2
∂Lsj
∂zk
−
J∑
j=2
∂Ldj
∂zj
+
J∑
j=2
∂Ls
1
∂zj
⎞⎠
=
1
Δ
∂Ld
1
∂p1
⎛⎝ J∑
k=2
⎛⎝ J∑
j=1
∂Lsj
∂zk
⎞⎠− J∑
j=2
∂Ldj
∂zj
⎞⎠
=
1
Δ
∂Ld
1
∂p1
⎛⎝ J∑
k=2
(
−
∂Ls
0
∂zk
)
−
J∑
j=2
∂Ldj
∂zj
⎞⎠ ,
which is non-negative, as
∂Ls
0
∂zk
≤ 0 and
∂Ldj
∂zj
≤ 0.
This shows that dz1
dp1
≥ dz2
dp1
≥ 0: wages in all sectors increase, and relative wages w1/wj increase.
As a consequence we also have, because
∂Ls
0
∂zj
≤ 0:
dL0
dp1
=
J∑
j=1
∂Ls
0
∂zj
dzj
dp1
≤ 0.
Hence non-employment decreases as a result of the demand shock.
We also get, differentiating Lj = L
d
j (pj , zj):
dLj
dp1
=
∂Ldj
∂zj
dzj
dp1
≤ 0, j ≥ 2.
Lastly:
dL1
dp1
= −
d
(
L0 +
∑J
j=2 Lj
)
dp1
≥ 0.
This shows the desired result.
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B Sample representativeness
We consider three issues in turn. A first concern with the data is that, by construction, individuals
who were working at some point in the period but died before 2004 are not part of our sample. So,
the earnings distributions that we construct may be non-representative of the working population,
especially for earlier years. To address this concern, we computed mortality rates by gender and age
using individual data provided by the Spanish statistics institute (INE ). Table B.1 reports yearly
mortality rates over the period 1988-2004. We see that, for the age categories that we consider,
mortality rates are low. Indeed the cumulative probabilities of death between 25 and 54 years old
are 4.2% for males and 3.4% for females, respectively. Weighted inequality estimates that correct for
attrition due to mortality are very similar to the unweighted ones.44
Table B.1: Mortality rates by gender and age group (deaths per 1000 individuals)
Men Women
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54
1988 0.83 0.76 0.89 1.31 1.93 3.57 0.57 0.56 0.74 1.19 1.69 0.310
1989 0.97 0.86 0.91 1.35 2.01 3.27 0.59 0.58 0.69 1.19 1.70 0.280
1990 1.01 0.96 0.92 1.36 2.00 3.17 0.59 0.63 0.75 1.10 1.65 0.270
1991 1.10 1.07 0.99 1.32 2.08 2.96 0.60 0.64 0.75 1.16 1.76 0.259
1992 1.06 1.15 1.01 1.33 2.06 2.80 0.62 0.65 0.71 1.07 1.72 0.231
1993 0.97 1.16 1.03 1.30 2.15 2.77 0.62 0.69 0.74 1.10 1.69 0.230
1994 0.94 1.22 1.10 1.28 2.14 2.81 0.59 0.76 0.77 1.06 1.79 0.232
1995 0.90 1.28 1.18 1.28 2.09 2.84 0.54 0.76 0.89 1.09 1.65 0.232
1996 0.79 1.22 1.21 1.31 1.98 2.92 0.55 0.80 0.83 1.13 1.56 0.227
1997 0.64 0.93 1.03 1.23 1.96 2.88 0.40 0.63 0.76 1.02 1.57 0.225
1998 0.58 0.78 0.95 1.24 1.82 2.81 0.38 0.50 0.71 1.07 1.53 0.226
1999 0.55 0.73 0.95 1.26 1.86 2.79 0.33 0.51 0.70 1.08 1.58 0.220
2000 0.54 0.66 0.92 1.28 1.83 2.74 0.32 0.48 0.70 1.10 1.53 0.214
2001 0.46 0.64 0.89 1.17 1.78 2.72 0.33 0.48 0.70 1.02 1.57 0.217
2002 0.45 0.60 0.83 1.19 1.80 2.68 0.30 0.43 0.68 0.99 1.56 0.216
2003 0.43 0.59 0.78 1.20 1.75 2.61 0.29 0.41 0.68 1.04 1.64 0.214
2004 0.41 0.51 0.79 1.08 1.78 2.63 0.28 0.40 0.60 0.99 1.52 0.212
Average 0.74 0.89 0.96 1.26 1.94 2.88 0.47 0.58 0.73 1.08 1.63 2.36
(1988-2004)
Source: National Statistics Institute.
A second concern with the data is the fact that some workers may have migrated out of the
country. Given the way the data are recorded, migrants who did not come back to Spain before 2004
are not in the MCVL dataset. This concern is alleviated by the fact that during this period Spain
became a host country for immigrants, as shown in Figure B.1 and Table B.2. The data show that,
between 1990 and 2000 the stock of emigrants leaving Spain has decreased. Given these numbers, we
consider that mobility out of the country does not represent an important source of attrition in our
sample.
44We also computed mortality rates by occupation (available for men), and we found small differences in
the age groups that we consider (workers aged 25-54).
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Table B.2: Stock of emigrants over total population by educational attainment (%)
1990 2000
Total College Non-college Total College Non-college
Abroad 2.07 2.12 2.06 1.83 1.91 1.80
Europe 1.69 0.93 1.78 1.48 1.17 1.56
America 0.34 1.11 0.25 0.31 0.69 0.21
Asia and Oceania 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03
Source: International Migration by Educational Attainment (2005, Release 1.1).
Figure B.1: Spanish crude rate of net migration in % (1988-2008)
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Notes: Source EUROSTAT. The indicator is defined as the ratio of net migration plus adjustment during the
year to the average population in that year, expressed per 1,000 inhabitants. Net migration plus adjustment is
the difference between the total change and the natural change of the population.
Finally, attrition due to long periods of inactivity is a serious source of concern for women. In-
dividuals who were in the labor force before 2004 and receive a retirement pension at some point in
the period 2005-2010 are part of our sample. However, individuals who stopped working at a young
age will typically not be in our sample. In fact, data for the Spanish section of the Survey of Health,
Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) show that a large number of Spanish women stopped
working early in their careers (see Figure B.2).45 For this reason, caution is needed when interpreting
the results we obtain for women as one moves back in time. See Garc´ıa-Pe´rez (2008), for a related
point.46
45Data in Figure B.2 correspond to individuals who were between 34 and 53 years old in 1988. Thus,
they are on average 6 years older than individuals in our sample. Although female labor participation has
clearly increased for younger cohorts, we think that those early-career interruptions may still be relevant to
our analysis.
46Figure B.3 shows a comparison of average age between the MCVL and the Spanish labor force survey
(EPA). One possibility to improve representativeness is to re-weight the data, using age-specific weights
calculated from the EPA. Felgueroso et al. (2010) use this method and find small differences for men, and
larger differences for women.
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Figure B.2: Age when an individual stopped working (Spain)
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Notes: Source SHARE. Individuals aged between 34 and 53 years in 1988.
Figure B.3: Average age (Spain)
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Notes: Sources MCVL = Continuous Sample of Working Histories; EPA = Spanish Labor Force Survey.
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C Two censoring correction methods
Here we present two censoring correction methods, which are based on different models of earnings.
The two models are conditional on individual covariates. Given the individual determinants available
in the data, it is convenient to construct cells, c, within which individual observations are treated sim-
ilarly. The cells incorporate three sources of heterogeneity, c = (skillc,agec,timec): broad occupation,
or “skill”, dummies, with 10 categories (such as “engineers, college”, “manual workers”, ...);47 age
dummies, from 25 to 54 years; and time dummies, which contain 23 yearly dummies (from 1988 to
2010) and 12 monthly dummies (from January to December).48 This yields a total of 82,800 cells. As
a complement, we also present results using education dummies (4 categories) as a proxy for skills.49
Method 1: quantile regression. Let wqc denote the qth conditional quantile of earnings in cell
c, where the percentile level q is a number in (0, 1). The conditional quantile satisfies:
Pr
(
wagei ≤ w
q
c
∣∣∣celli = c) = q.
We model the logarithm of wqc (or alternatively the conditional quantile of log-earnings)
50 as:
log (wqc) = γ
q
sskillc + γ
q
aagec + γ
q
t timec, (C.1)
where γqs, γ
q
a, and γ
q
t are q-specific parameters to be estimated. Linear quantile models such as (C.1)
are widely used in applied work, since Koenker and Bassett (1978). See Gosling et al. (2000) for an
application to earnings inequality.
When, as in our application, covariates are grouped into cells, Chamberlain (1991) notes that
the parameters may be consistently estimated using a simple two-step approach. In the first step, we
estimate wqc in each cell c, and for all q belonging to a finite grid of values. We take q ∈ {.01, .02, ..., .99},
and compute sample quantiles ŵqc . Note that some quantiles are censored, so ŵ
q
c will be missing for
some (c, q) pairs.
Then, in the second step, and for each q value in the grid, we pool all cells together and regress
log (wqc) on skillc, agec, and timec. In this regression, the cell is the unit of observation. Following
Chamberlain (1991), we weight each observation by (the square root of) the sample size of the cell. The
parameter estimates are denoted as γ̂qs, γ̂
q
a and γ̂
q
t . Lastly, once the parameters have been estimated
we predict daily earnings using:
wq,QRc = exp (γ̂
q
sskillc + γ̂
q
aagec + γ̂
q
t timec) . (C.2)
Importantly, wq,QRc is always well-defined even if, because of censoring, the sample quantile ŵ
q
c is
missing. The extrapolation relies on the assumption that conditional quantiles are linear in skillc, agec
and timec. For example, this model rules out skill/time interaction effects. If linearity is violated in
the data, the predicted quantiles may poorly approximate the true quantiles of uncensored earnings.
Method 2: tobit regression. In the second method, we parametrically model log-earnings in
a cell. Specifically we suppose that, within cell c, log-earnings follow a distribution with density fc
that is fully characterized by a cell-specific parameter θc. We impose no restrictions on fc or θc across
cells.
Parameters θc can be estimated using a cell-by-cell maximum likelihood approach. Given the
double censoring, the likelihood function has three parts in general. Let wc and wc denote the upper
47See notes in Table C.1 for a definition of the 10 categories.
48Note that, in this way, birth cohorts are mechanically taken into account, as they are a linear combination
of age and calendar time.
49The four education categories are: less than elementary school, high school dropout, high school graduate,
and college.
50Indeed, it follows from a well-known property of quantiles that: log (wqc) = (logw)
q
c
.
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and lower caps on earnings in cell c, respectively. Let censi be a discrete variable that takes three
values: 1 when wagei is top-coded, −1 when it is bottom-coded, and 0 when the wage is uncensored.
The likelihood function in cell c is, restricting i to belong to that cell:∑
censi=−1
log Pr (log wagei ≤ logwc) +
∑
censi=0
log fc (log wagei) +
∑
censi=1
log Pr (log wagei ≥ logwc) .
The parameter θc is estimated by maximizing this function.
Let Fc denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of log-earnings (that is, the integral of
fc), and let F̂c denote its value at the maximum likelihood estimate of θc. Conditional quantiles of
earnings are predicted as:
wq,MLc = exp
(
F̂−1c (q)
)
. (C.3)
The nature of the extrapolation here is very different from the quantile regression approach. The
validity of the latter relies on between-cells restrictions, which take the form of linearity assumptions
on the conditional quantile functions. Here, in contrast, the validity of (C.3) relies on within-cells
restrictions, according to which the parametric distribution fc must be correctly specified.
The choice of the parametric distribution fc is important. Consistently with a large literature
that finds that log-normality provides a reasonable approximation to empirical earnings distributions,
we specify fc to be Gaussian with cell-specific means and variances μc and σ
2
c , respectively. Denoting
as Φ the standard normal cdf, the cell-specific likelihood function takes the familiar form (up to an
additive constant):∑
censi=−1
log Φ
(
logwc − μc
σc
)
+
∑
censi=0
[
−
1
2
log σ2c −
1
2σ2c
(log wagei − μc)
2
]
+
∑
censi=1
log
(
1− Φ
(
logwc − μc
σc
))
.
Moreover, in the log-normal case, conditional earnings quantiles are predicted using:
wqc = exp
(
μ̂c + σ̂cΦ
−1(q)
)
, (C.4)
where (μ̂c, σ̂c) is the maximum likelihood estimate of (μc, σc).
51
Recovering unconditional quantiles. After estimating the model, we simulate earnings in
every cell using the model for the conditional quantiles, wqc . This is immediate in method 2, as the
earnings distribution is known within cells. In the quantile regression approach (method 1) we simulate
earnings as follows: (i) we draw ui, uniformly on (0, 1); and (ii) we compute the simulated earnings
in cell c as wui,QRc , where w
q,QR
c is given by (C.2). Unconditional earnings quantiles, for a given year,
are then computed as the sample quantiles of the simulated data (as in Machado and Mata, 2005).52
51Similarly, Dustmann et al. (2009) impute censored earnings under the assumption that the error term in
the log-earnings regression is normally distributed, with different variances for each education and each age
group. Then, as we do, for each year they impute censored earnings as the sum of the predicted earnings and
a random component, drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and a cell-specific variance. This
approach differs from the one in Boldrin et al. (2004) and Felgueroso et al. (2010), who simulate earnings
only for the workers whose original earnings were censored.
52Given the very large sample sizes, this approach will deliver very similar results to the ones obtained using
exact analytical formulas (Melly, 2006).
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Table C.1: Caps in the General Regime
Groups 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Maximum
1-4 2574.9 2652.0 2731.5 2813.4 2897.7 2996.1 3074.1 3166.2 3198.0
5-7 2574.9 2652.0 2731.5 2813.4 2897.7 2996.1 3074.1 3166.2 3198.0
8-10 85.83 88.4 91.05 93.78 96.59 99.87 102.47 105.54 106.60
Minimum
1 768.9 784.2 799.8 836.1 881.1 929.7 977.4 1016.4 1031.7
2 637.9 650.7 663.6 693.6 731.1 771.3 810.9 843.3 855.9
3 554.4 565.5 576.9 603.0 635.7 670.8 705.3 733.1 744.6
4-7 516.0 526.5 537.3 598.5 631.2 665.7 699.9 728.1 738.9
8-10 17.2 17.55 17.91 19.95 21.04 22.19 23.33 24.27 24.63
Notes: Quantities in nominal EUR. Monthly for groups 1-7 and daily for 8-11. Group 1: Engineers, College.
Group 2: Technicians. Group 3: Administrative managers. Group 4: Assistants. Groups 5-7: Administrative
workers. Groups 8-10: Manual workers.
Figure C.1: Caps in the General Regime
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Notes: Monthly quantities in nominal EUR. See notes in Table C.1 for a definition of the groups.
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Figure C.2: MCVL matched with Tax data: Kernel densities
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Notes: Sources Social Security data and Income Tax data. Solid lines are observed annual earnings
from Social Security data. Dashed lines are observed annual earnings from Income Tax data. To draw
the graphs we have dropped individuals with earnings over 3 times their corresponding top-cap (4 times
for Group 1: Engineers, College graduates), which amounts to dropping 0.2% of the observations.
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D Tables and Figures
Table D.0: Sample composition and Descriptive Statistics by gender
Whole sample
Total Men % Women %
Individuals 93,132 52,878 56.78 40,254 43.22
Observations 12,670,734 7,375,381 58.21 5,295,353 41.79
1988 1997 2007 2010 1988 1997 2007 2010 1988 1997 2007 2010
Average Age 36.27 37.22 37.92 38.72 37.02 37.86 38.16 38.95 34.48 36.28 37.64 38.46
(8.08) (8.17) (8.11) (8.05) (8.20) (8.35) (8.14) (8.02) (7.48) (7.81) (8.07) (8.07)
Immigrants (%) 1.69 3.78 15.09 15.89 1.54 3.95 16.85 17.43 2.04 3.52 12.98 14.08
Engineers-College 6.60 6.46 7.23 7.80 7.34 7.37 7.33 7.70 4.84 5.11 7.12 7.91
Technicians 4.73 4.82 5.89 6.16 3.50 3.72 4.50 4.64 7.70 6.47 7.55 7.93
Adm. managers 5.00 4.53 4.26 4.22 5.82 5.72 5.25 5.07 3.06 2.75 3.07 3.22
Assistants 3.68 3.38 3.20 3.30 4.42 4.25 3.63 3.63 1.93 2.08 2.68 2.92
Adm. workers 24.75 27.44 28.71 29.59 18.77 19.53 18.97 20.00 39.07 39.27 40.31 40.82
Manual workers 55.22 53.36 50.71 48.92 60.16 59.41 60.31 58.95 43.39 44.31 39.26 37.19
Annual 17.10 28.74 15.55 18.18 14.41 25.25 14.51 19.18 23.42 33.93 16.79 17.01
workdays=0
Working individuals
Total Men % Women %
Individuals 92,579 52,599 56.82 39,980 43.18
Observations 8,526,953 5,185,955 60.82 3,340,998 39.18
1988 1997 2007 2010 1988 1997 2007 2010 1988 1997 2007 2010
Average Age 36.90 37.39 37.82 38.69 37.52 37.92 38.12 38.96 35.18 36.44 37.43 38.38
(8.12) (8.23) (8.11) (8.05) (8.21) (8.33) (8.14) (8.02) (7.60) (7.96) (8.06) (8.07)
Immigrants (%) 1.69 3.51 14.79 13.41 1.57 3.62 16.53 14.54 2.02 3.31 12.54 12.12
Engineers-College 7.01 7.26 8.22 9.55 7.70 7.79 8.04 9.53 5.09 6.34 8.47 9.57
Technicians 5.26 6.29 6.81 7.62 3.95 4.53 5.00 5.74 8.89 9.39 9.17 9.77
Adm. managers 5.87 5.77 4.77 4.88 6.58 6.81 5.67 5.85 3.89 3.94 3.60 3.76
Assistants 4.38 4.31 3.56 3.81 5.12 5.26 4.07 4.32 2.30 2.64 2.90 3.22
Adm. workers 26.25 30.43 30.20 32.38 20.06 21.86 19.59 22.18 43.48 45.54 43.97 44.06
Manual workers 51.23 45.93 46.43 41.77 56.58 53.74 57.63 52.38 36.35 32.15 31.90 29.61
Top-coded 24.02 17.84 13.57 14.82 27.10 21.48 16.07 17.98 15.44 11.41 10.33 11.21
Bottom-coded 4.45 7.18 7.32 9.22 3.01 4.00 3.37 4.96 8.46 12.80 12.44 14.10
Median daily 44.81 45.84 47.44 49.09 46.54 48.36 50.93 53.76 40.78 41.84 42.66 43.87
earnings (19.5) (23.5) (24.4) (25.2) (19.8) (23.6) (23.9) (24.7) (17.9) (22.5) (24.3) (24.9)
Temporary (%) - 33.21 28.15 25.54 - 32.17 28.57 24.86 - 35.05 27.60 26.32
Note: Standard deviations of non-binary variables in parentheses.
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Table D.1: Overall Inequality Ratios
1995 2002* 2002 2006
(A) Ratios from the Wage Structure Survey**
Men w90/w10 3.64 3.48 3.59 3.33
w90/w50 2.08 2.22 2.23 2.15
w50/w10 1.75 1.57 1.61 1.55
Women w90/w10 3.23 3.02 3.50 3.00
w90/w50 2.08 2.06 2.27 2.03
w50/w10 1.55 1.46 1.54 1.48
(B) Ratios from Social Security data***
Men w90/w10 4.21 4.21 3.83
w90/w50 2.29 2.30 2.17
w50/w10 1.84 1.83 1.77
Women w90/w10 4.29 4.70 4.45
w90/w50 2.10 2.21 2.19
w50/w10 2.04 2.12 2.04
Notes: * Figures exclude some non-market sectors (education,
health, and social services) to obtain comparable figures with
those for 1995. ** Ratios of percentiles of Hourly Wages.
** Ratios of estimated quantiles of Daily Earnings.
Table D.2: Sectors definitions
Industry: Agriculture, mining, food and tobacco industry, clothing and
footwear industry, metal industry, paper industry, timber industry,
plastics industry, chemical industry, machinery and car industry,
furniture industry and manufacturing.
Construction: All general building works, installation systems and extensions
(electrical system, painting, plumbing and tiling, carpentry,
flooring, plastering), civil engineering works, renting of the
building equipment.
Services: Sales, hotels, storing, transport, telecommunications and energy,
financial services, corporate services, personal services,
administration, education, health, social activities.
Public services: When the employer is any local, regional
or national government institution.
Private services: Otherwise.
High-skilled (HS): Skill groups 1-3.
Mid-skilled (MS): Skill groups 4-7.
Low-skilled (LS): Skill groups 8-10.
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Table D.3: Age and skill (occupation) groups: decomposition
1988 1997 2007 2010 1988-1996 1997-2006 2007-2010 1988-1996 1997-2006 2007-2010
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
I. MEN
Ratios of estimated quantiles (A) Change in ratios
90/10 3.67 4.23 3.84 4.21 15.97 -9.53 9.55
90/50 2.06 2.29 2.18 2.26 11.57 -5.35 3.81
50/10 1.78 1.85 1.76 1.86 3.94 -4.41 5.53
80/20 2.30 2.49 2.31 2.46 8.36 -7.25 6.69
80/50 1.56 1.65 1.58 1.63 5.63 -4.20 3.06
50/20 1.47 1.50 1.46 1.51 2.59 -3.18 3.53
Composition constant (B) Price effects Composition effects: (A)-(B)
90/10 w. 3.79 4.13 4.12 4.21 12.32 -7.23 2.07 3.65 -2.30 7.48
90/50 w. 2.11 2.26 2.30 2.26 9.16 -4.01 -1.73 2.41 -1.34 5.54
50/10 w. 1.80 1.83 1.79 1.86 2.89 -3.36 3.87 1.05 -1.05 1.66
80/20 w. 2.35 2.44 2.40 2.46 6.25 -5.33 2.50 2.11 -1.92 4.19
80/50 w. 1.58 1.63 1.63 1.63 4.33 -3.03 0.17 1.30 -1.17 2.89
50/20 w. 1.48 1.50 1.48 1.51 1.84 -2.37 2.32 0.75 -0.81 1.21
Composition and mu constant (C) Within variation Between variation: (B)-(C)
90/10 w. 4.19 4.04 4.15 4.21 1.52 -5.09 1.44 10.80 -2.14 0.63
90/50 w. 2.30 2.23 2.30 2.26 -0.01 -2.81 -1.54 9.17 -1.20 -0.19
50/10 w. 1.82 1.81 1.80 1.86 1.53 -2.35 3.02 1.36 -1.01 0.85
80/20 w. 2.47 2.39 2.40 2.46 0.96 -3.42 2.42 5.29 -1.91 0.08
80/50 w. 1.65 1.61 1.62 1.63 0.16 -1.91 0.48 4.17 -1.12 -0.31
50/20 w. 1.50 1.48 1.48 1.51 0.79 -1.53 1.94 1.05 -0.84 0.38
II. WOMEN
Ratios of estimated quantiles (A) Change in ratios
90/10 3.40 4.43 4.47 4.71 30.44 0.63 5.16
90/50 1.87 2.13 2.21 2.27 14.11 2.77 2.82
50/10 1.81 2.08 2.03 2.07 14.31 -2.09 2.27
80/20 2.24 2.66 2.62 2.73 18.76 -0.38 2.92
80/50 1.51 1.65 1.66 1.69 9.02 0.61 1.47
50/20 1.48 1.62 1.59 1.62 8.94 -0.99 1.43
Composition constant (B) Price effects Composition effects: (A)-(B)
90/10 w. 3.51 4.53 4.59 4.71 26.22 -1.71 2.57 4.22 2.34 2.59
90/50 w. 1.89 2.16 2.24 2.27 12.83 1.15 1.31 1.28 1.62 1.51
50/10 w. 1.85 2.04 2.05 2.07 11.87 -2.83 1.23 2.44 0.74 1.04
80/20 w. 2.29 2.70 2.70 2.73 16.13 -1.76 0.93 2.63 -1.38 1.99
80/50 w. 1.53 1.66 1.68 1.69 8.15 -0.25 0.31 0.87 0.86 1.16
50/20 w. 1.50 1.62 1.61 1.62 7.37 -1.52 0.62 1.57 0.53 0.81
Composition and mu constant (C) Within variation Between variation: (B)-(C)
90/10 w. 3.95 4.41 4.71 4.71 12.24 1.02 -0.11 13.98 -0.69 2.68
90/50 w. 2.06 2.16 2.29 2.27 3.74 1.09 -0.82 9.09 0.06 2.13
50/10 w. 1.92 2.04 2.06 2.07 8.18 -0.07 0.72 3.69 -2.76 0.51
80/20 w. 2.47 2.65 2.74 2.73 7.74 0.16 -0.41 8.39 -1.60 1.34
80/50 w. 1.61 1.66 1.70 1.69 2.69 -0.02 -0.66 5.46 -0.23 0.97
50/20 w. 1.54 1.60 1.61 1.62 4.92 0.18 0.25 2.45 -1.34 0.37
Notes: Ratios of estimated daily earnings from Social Security data. w=re-weighted.
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Table D.4: Age, occupation groups, and sectors: decomposition (men)
1988 1997 2007 2010 1988-1996 1997-2006 2007-2010 1988-1996 1997-2006 2007-2010
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Ratios of estimated quantiles (A) Change in ratios
90/10 3.66 4.21 3.73 4.03 15.47 -11.37 8.05
90/50 2.07 2.29 2.14 2.20 10.77 -6.78 2.97
50/10 1.77 1.84 1.74 1.83 4.25 -4.93 4.94
80/20 2.31 2.48 2.29 2.41 7.92 -7.81 5.29
80/50 1.57 1.65 1.58 1.62 5.56 -4.55 2.39
50/20 1.47 1.50 1.45 1.49 2.24 -3.42 2.83
Composition constant (B) Price effects Composition effects: (A)-(B)
90/10 w. 3.72 4.13 4.02 4.03 13.61 -9.58 0.11 1.86 -1.79 7.94
90/50 w. 2.11 2.30 2.22 2.20 8.86 -7.25 -0.98 1.91 0.47 3.95
50/10 w. 1.76 1.80 1.81 1.83 4.37 -2.52 1.11 -0.12 -2.41 3.83
80/20 w. 2.33 2.43 2.40 2.41 7.05 -5.76 0.22 0.87 -2.05 5.07
80/50 w. 1.58 1.65 1.62 1.62 4.59 -4.09 -0.14 0.97 -0.46 2.53
50/20 w. 1.47 1.47 1.48 1.49 2.36 -1.74 0.36 -0.12 -1.68 2.47
Composition and mu constant (C) Within variation Between variation: (B)-(C)
90/10 w. 4.19 3.95 4.10 4.03 0.95 -5.47 -1.61 12.66 -4.11 1.72
90/50 w. 2.32 2.21 2.23 2.20 -1.05 -3.43 -1.24 9.91 -3.82 0.26
50/10 w. 1.80 1.79 1.84 1.83 2.02 -2.11 -0.37 2.35 -0.41 1.48
80/20 w. 2.45 2.35 2.41 2.41 1.71 -2.62 0.06 5.34 -3.14 0.16
80/50 w. 1.65 1.60 1.61 1.62 0.34 -1.59 0.36 4.25 -2.50 -0.50
50/20 w. 1.48 1.46 1.49 1.49 1.36 -1.04 -0.29 1.00 -0.70 0.65
Notes: Ratios of estimated daily earnings from Social Security data. w=re-weighted.
Table D.5: Estimated Unconditional Quantiles of Potential Earnings (peq)
1988 1997 2007 2010 1988-1996 1997-2006 2007-2010
(%) (%) (%)
All pe10 21.19 18.95 21.79 21.74 -9.92 11.39 -0.21
pe50 42.11 42.29 46.19 48.94 0.82 6.17 5.95
pe90 89.46 98.89 104.22 114.21 10.96 2.08 9.56
Men pe10 22.95 22.59 26.76 26.32 -1.43 14.76 -1.65
pe50 44.18 46.01 50.68 54.09 4.18 7.18 6.74
pe90 95.21 108.11 113.86 125.09 13.23 2.15 9.86
Women pe10 17.88 15.08 17.72 18.02 -15.19 13.85 1.72
pe50 37.14 36.44 40.29 42.73 -1.30 7.22 6.04
pe90 76.23 85.91 93.64 101.60 13.66 5.26 8.51
Notes: Unconditional quantiles estimated from Social Security data.
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Table D.6: Estimated Unconditional Quantiles of Daily Income (iq)
1988 1997 2007 2010 1988-1996 1997-2006 2007-2010
(%) (%) (%)
All i10 18.61 13.64 16.96 16.94 -23.78 18.49 -0.10
i50 39.91 36.67 42.08 41.41 -8.15 11.44 -1.59
i90 85.30 89.96 96.80 99.96 5.61 4.13 3.26
Men i10 20.46 16.77 21.51 20.12 -15.78 23.57 -6.44
i50 42.10 40.71 46.90 45.69 -3.77 12.03 -2.56
i90 90.41 99.96 106.26 108.99 9.06 2.89 2.57
Women i10 14.99 10.69 13.77 14.40 -25.71 21.13 4.53
i50 34.67 30.25 35.89 36.38 -12.47 14.58 1.36
i90 71.05 75.84 86.08 89.59 7.07 9.63 4.09
Notes: Unconditional quantiles estimated from Social Security data.
Figure D.1: Skill, education, and age groups: earnings gaps and employment (women)
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Figure D.2: Age and occupation groups: decomposition (women)
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Figure D.3: Age and education groups: decomposition (men)
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Figure D.4: Temporary rates (men)
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Figure D.5: Inequality (men), with and without immigrant workers
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Figure D.6: Shares of foreign-born workers by sector (men)
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Figure D.7: Unemployment-adjusted Unconditional Quantiles of Daily Earnings
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Notes: Source Social Security data. Solid lines are estimated daily earnings conditional on employment. Long-
dashed lines are estimated potential earnings. Short-dashed lines are estimated labor income, based on imputed
unemployment benefits. Men (left graph) and women (right graph).
Figure D.8: Median unemployment duration (in years)
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